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ABSTRACT 
Zero-leverage Firms and Their Mergers & Acquisitions  
Shufei Wu  
 
We examine whether the M&A decisions of zero-leverage (ZL) firms may not be optimal (value-
maximizing) as their choices of targets may be limited for maintaining zero leverage, by 
comparing their short-term announcement returns and long-term post-acquisition firm 
performance with leverage firms. Our main findings are as follows: debt-free companies tend to 
acquire targets with low or zero leverage; zero-leverage acquirers underperform non-ZL 
acquirers around event announcement and the result is robust to using the matched sample 
and controlling for bidder management quality, governance quality, and bidder, target and deal 
characteristics; compared to levered buyers, zero-debt buyers display significantly lower long-
term post-acquisition operating performance as well as lower post-acquisition stock return 
performance, and the difference in the long-term operating performance between zero-
leverage and leverage bidders is robust to the methodology and benchmark used. Overall, our 
results show that unlevered firms underperform levered firms during and after the M&A 
activities.  Our results suggest that M&A decisions of zero-leverage acquirers may not be value 
maximizing since they tend to draw on a limited pool of targets given their preference to 
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1. Introduction  
In recent years, there have been more than 1/5 of firms that are zero-leverage (ZL) in the 
USA, including both short- and long-term debt, in their capital structure. The tendency of so 
many firms to eschew any debt is called the zero - leverage puzzle (Yang, 2013). This zero - 
leverage phenomenon is not consistent with standard capital structure theories: the trade-
off theory (Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973) and the pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf, 
1984), both of which advocate financing with debt (Bessler et al., 2013).  So studying ZL 
firms is vital for us to have a better understanding of capital structure decisions. It is also 
universally acknowledged that a firm’s capital structure has a dramatic impact on its 
mergers and acquisitions (M&As) decisions.  In this study we investigate the M&A decisions 
of ZL firms as well as the influence of these decisions on their firm value.  
The volume of empirical work on zero-leverage firms is very small, most of which focus on 
researching the determinants of zero-leverage behavior and characteristics of ZL firms. For 
example, Ilya et al. (2013) find that in US the zero-leverage and low-leverage phenomena is 
triggered by managerial preference, CEO and governance characteristics of firms, while Erik 
et al. (2012) hold a different opinion and argue that it has nothing to do with governance 
mechanisms and it is the result of financial constraints. Bessler et al. (2013) also propose 
that only a small number of firms deliberately maintain zero-leverage while most zero-
leverage firms are constrained by their debt capacity after studying the industrial firms from 
20 developed countries. Lee et al. (2011) and Hoque et al. (2010) examine the firm 
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performance of ZL firms and conclude that debt-free firms tend to perform better over the 
long-term and short-term periods.  
Some previous studies investigate the relationship between capital structure decisions and 
M&As activities. Mattsson (2012) states that both highly overleveraged firms and 
underleveraged companies have less tendency to make acquisitions. Harford, Klasa and 
Walcott (2009) and Hutchinson (1995) document that bidders with higher leverage tend to 
finance their acquisitions with equity rather than debt. Uysal (2011) and Hu and Yang (2016) 
find that overleveraged firms are less likely to use cash or pay high premium in the 
acquisitions. Some previous research study the effect of M&A decisions on firm 
performance. Tuch and Sullivan (2007) mention that if bidders buy larger targets, hostile 
targets and use cash in their offers, they tend to experience better performance. The study 
on the association between M&A premia, deal size and firm value suggests that even if 
acquirers pay observably lower premia for large targets, they still experience significantly 
more negative firm performance in large deals than in small ones (Alexandridis et al. 2013). 
Dutta and Jog (2009), Tao et al. (2017) and Siegel et al. (2010) do not find negative short-
term or long-term firm performance for Canadian acquirers, Chinese firms and Swedish 
manufacturing companies, respectively. However, these above-mentioned literature does 
not analyze ZL firms separately from other firms.  
The only exception is a working paper by Bae et at. (2014) who examine acquisition 
decisions of ZL firms.  They find debt-free companies tend to acquire targets with low or 
zero leverage in order to maintain zero leverage, and these firms do not particularly suffer 
3 
 
from value-destroying acquisitions and their post-acquisition stock performances are not 
worse than those of matched firms. 
In this paper we argue that given their preference for maintaining zero leverage or low 
leverage, for ZL firms their choices of targets may be limited and hence, they may not 
acquire the optimal targets, which may result in their underperformance compared with 
non-ZL firms in the short-term announcement period and long-term post-acquisition period 
as well.  We use a large sample of M&A decisions of zero-leverage firms to test our 
hypothesis by comparing their short-term and long-term firm performances during and 
after M&As respectively with those of leveraged firms. 
Our sample consists of 3,527 completed US public mergers and tender offers during the 
period of 1985 to 2015 and we find consistent results with our above-mentioned hypothesis. 
First, we document systematically significant differences in the bidder, target and deal 
characteristics between zero-leverage and leveraged acquirers. For example, ZL acquirers 
have significantly smaller size and higher growth than leveraged firms do and their 
corresponding targets are also smaller and have higher growth, indicating that they are 
riskier and inclined to pursue acquisitions with higher risk, which do cause value deduction 
and lower returns. Consistent with our hypothesis that ZL firms’ M&As choices may be 
limited, we find unlevered bidders do tend to acquire unlevered targets. Also, leveraged 
firms’ targets have significantly more free cash flow than unlevered firms’ targets do, which 
can generate more value-enhancing acquisitions for leveraged firms. Besides, the difference 
of pre-announcement price run up (in %) between leveraged and near zero-leverage firms’ 
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targets is found to be negative and significant, so near ZL acquirers may have a higher cost 
of acquisition and it may negatively influence their firm performance. Finally, unlevered 
firms are relatively less likely to pay for deals with cash while cash acquisitions earn higher 
returns.   
An extensive examination of the short-term and long-term performances of acquiring firms 
demonstrates that ZL buyers experience significantly more negative announcement 
abnormal returns than leveraged buyers, and this finding is robust to using matched sample 
and controlling for bidder management quality, corporate governance quality, and bidder, 
target and deal characteristics. ZL bidders also display significant subprime industry and 
matched firm adjusted operating performance during the 3-year and 5-year post-acquisition 
periods, and it is robust to the methodology and benchmark used. Results using 3-year and 
5-year buy-and-hold abnormal stock returns are not consistent with our above-mentioned 
findings, as the stock market is affected by many factors in the long-run.  
The following parts of the paper are organized as follows: Section 2 presents the relevant 
literature reviews. Section 3 and section 4 describes the data and summarizes the 
methodology respectively, and Section 5 states empirical results and section 6 concludes. 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. Research on Zero-leverage Firms  
The volume of empirical study on zero-leverage firms is small. Most of them focus on 
studying the determinants of zero-leverage behavior and try to explain the zero-leverage 
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puzzle. Some of these papers carry out research into US non-financial firms. For example, 
Ilya et al. (2013) conclude zero-leverage behavior is because of managerial preference, and 
the CEO and governance characteristics of firms, such as CEO ownership, tenure, board size, 
board independence and family status, are likely important determinants of the zero-
leverage and low-leverage phenomena. But Erik et al. (2012) propose neither internal nor 
external governance mechanisms can explain a firm’s conservative approach to debt 
financing, and it is the result of financial constraints. Soku et al. (2012) also state that firms' 
extreme debt conservatism is triggered by the favorable equity market valuation and 
borrowing constraints. Some of the other previous research investigate international zero-
leverage firms. For instance, Bessler et al. (2013) examine industrial firms from 20 
developed countries and apply a detailed comparison between constrained and 
unconstrained debt-free firms and document that only a small number of firms deliberately 
maintain zero-leverage while most zero-leverage firms are constrained by their debt 
capacity. Viet (2013) conducts this research on UK non-financial firms and indicates that the 
zero-leverage phenomenon can be explained by a combination of considerations of 
financial constraints, underinvestment incentives, financial flexibility, and macroeconomic 
conditions. Adverse macroeconomic conditions increase the tendency of firms to avoid debt 
and accumulate cash to preserve financial flexibility and meet financing needs, especially 
for less financial constrained companies. However, Takami (2016) find that Japanese firms 
are inhibited from zero leverage by the factors - financial constraints and bank 
shareholdings, which are more powerful than the factor of foreign investors encouraging 
unleverage. Based on the empirical evidence from Nigeria, zero-leverage behavior is 
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attributed to firm size, age and profitability, and bigger, younger and more profitable firms 
are more likely to retain zero-leverage. (Ezeoha ,2008).  
Some research investigates the firm performance of zero-leverage firms. The empirical 
evidence shows debt-free firms tend to perform better over the long-term and short-term 
periods (Lee et al., 2011 and Hoque et al., 2010). And Babak (2016) argue that these firms 
do not lose value by not levering up because they optimally hold the real option to have 
debt later. 
Erik et al. (2012) study whether the corporate governance mechanism of zero-leverage 
firms is better than leveraged firms and prove that the internal and external governance 
mechanisms of zero-debt firms are not weaker than those of non- ZL firms, so their debt 
initiation decisions are not attributed to shocks to managerial entrenchment, such as 
takeover threats or activist block holders. 
Only Bae et at. (2014) research zero-leverage firms and their acquisition activities. Their 
findings present that zero-leverage firms do not tend to pursue value-destroying 
acquisitions, although their managers have high levels of discretion. These firms prefer to 
acquire low or zero-leverage targets in order to maintain zero leverage and they are more 
likely to use cash than equity in their transactions and their post-acquisition stock 
performances do not suffer from their acquisition activities. 
2.2. Impact of Capital Structure on Mergers and Acquisitions Decisions  
       It is widely accepted that a firm’s capital structure has a great impact on its M&A decisions. 
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Harford, Klasa and Walcott (2009) and Hutchinson (1995) examine how acquirers choose to 
finance acquisitions and adjust their capital structure after acquisitions based on their 
target capital structures, and they find that when a bidder's leverage is above its target level, 
it is more likely to finance the acquisition with equity rather than debt. Uysal (2011) also 
shows managers consider deviations from their target capital structures when planning and 
structuring acquisitions, overleveraged firms are less likely to make acquisitions and are less 
likely to use cash in their offers, and they prefer to acquire smaller targets and pay lower 
premiums. Besides, Mattsson (2012) presents that both of highly overleveraged firms and 
underleveraged companies are associated with lower acquisition probability, they seem to 
make more shareholder value increasing acquisitions and acquire above average abnormal 
announcement return. 
Qiu et al. (2005) study the relationship between financial leverage and the firms' investment 
decisions on Canadian publicly traded companies. Their results show that leverage has a 
negative impact on firm investment and this negative effect is more obvious for firms with 
lower growth opportunities.  
Hu and Yang (2016) investigate the role of leverage in cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions in 57 countries, their study provide international evidence on how leverage 
affects managerial decision to acquire foreign targets and their results prove that the 
interdependent relationship between investment decision and financing decision also exists 
in other countries besides America and Canada. Similar to the results of the study on North 
America, they also find that firms with higher leverage are less likely to use cash or pay high 
premium in the acquisition, and underleveraged firms adjust their capital structure before 
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the acquisition by issuing more debt, while overleveraged firms issue more equity after the 
acquisition. Besides, firms tend to acquire foreign targets with lower leverage, whereas 
firms are less likely to be regarded as targets by foreign bidders with higher leverage, and 
this finding is more significant in Asian countries than North America.  
The existing literature demonstrates the interdependent relationship between capital 
structure decisions and acquisitions exists globally, but they do not analyze ZL firms 
separately from other firms.  
2.3. Impact of Mergers and Acquisitions Decisions on Firm Performance   
Hu and Yang (2016) prove that foreign bidders gain positive abnormal returns in the short-
run, but negative returns in the long run, while targets earn positive abnormal returns in the 
both short run and long run. AGRAWAL et al. (1992) find acquiring firms’ 5-year post-merger 
return is about -10%, and this is robust to various specifications. A review of empirical 
research states that acquisitions have an insignificant impact on shareholder wealth in the 
short run but an overwhelmingly negative effect in the long term, and acquirers with 
superior pre‐bid performance are more likely to underperform in the post‐bid period. If 
bidders acquire larger targets, hostile targets and use cash to pay for the transaction, they 
tend to experience better performance (Tuch and Sullivan, 2007). But the study on the 
association between M&A premia, deal size and firm value suggests that even if acquiring 
firms pay observably lower premia for large targets, they still experience significantly more 
negative firm performance in large deals than in small ones, and this result can largely be 
attributed to the unobserved complexity inherent in large deals (Alexandridis et al. 2013). 
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Ma et al.  (2011) measure the long-term influence of mergers on acquirers’ intrinsic value 
and the results also exhibit that bidders suffer a loss on average over the three - year post-
merger period, which is mainly driven by decreases in expected returns. This is the case 
especially for firms with high initial intrinsic values. They also mention that the poor post-
acquisition stock returns recorded in other research can be primarily due to decreasing 
intrinsic value rather than changes in valuation levels. Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999) 
suppose that the more similar a firm's acquisition targets are to its prior targets, the better 
they perform.  
Dutta and Jog (2009) do not find negative long-term operating performance or stock 
performance for Canadian bidders after their acquisitions. For Chinese firms, the 
announcement of cross-border M&As causes a positive stock market reaction, and the level 
of targeting countries’ political risk negatively affects the acquirers’ short-term market 
performance (Tao et al., 2017). For Swedish manufacturing firms, their performance does 
not decline after M&As and plant productivity gets enhanced as well, although 
establishments and firms shrank (Siegel and Simons, 2010). Through the study on overseas 
acquisitions by developing country multinational companies (DMNCs), Singh and Kale (2017) 
demonstrate that DMNCs earn better acquisition performance when they keep the target 
“structurally separate” from their own organization and retain its senior executives, and it 
also improves performance by “linking mechanisms” to coordinate interdependencies 
between the two firms.  Salaber et al. (2016) argue that M&As in ASEAN （Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations）countries show value destruction during the post-M&A period, 
yet, M&As implemented during the financial crisis are more profitable than those 
10 
 
completed before or after the crisis. Also, during the crisis, firms’ characteristics related to 
M&A activity like payment method, industry relatedness and targets’ relative size are found 
to have no impact on performance.  
Huang et al. (2017) examine the influence of national cultural differences on cross‐border 
post‐acquisition performance, they apply a different approach- power distance value (PDV) 
to measure one dimension of national cultural values and conduct the research in the global 
information technology industry. They find a negative relationship between PDV differences 
and bidders’ long‐term post‐bid performance and this relationship is stronger when 
acquiring firms’ PDV are higher than acquired firms’ than the opposite case. However, the 
investigation by Savović (2017) indicates that organizational culture differences can create 
firm value in Serbia if the managers of acquirers properly understand and manage the 
culture differences, and employees’ attitudes towards the diversities is a partial mediator of 
the relationship between culture differences and post-acquisition performance, so the 
managers should also monitor and evaluate employees’ attitudes, there by helping to 
improve the firm performance.  
Our study adds to the existing body of literature by analyzing the M&A decisions of ZL firms 
as well as the influence on their firm performance separately from other firms. Also, we 
propose a different hypothesis towards their firm performances under the impact of their 
preferred M&A decisions and find different results from the existing literature as well. We 
conduct this research by comparing zero-leverage firms with matched non-ZL firms for their 
announcement abnormal returns in the short-term and industry and matched firm adjusted 
return on assets (ROA) as well as buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) in the long-term 
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period so as to investigate whether ZL firms underperform leveraged firms with the 
influence of M&A activities. 
3. Data  
To construct our sample, we start with the data collection of acquisition deals from 
Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum database and our data is comprised of 
successful mergers and tender offers from January 1, 1985 to December 1, 2015. We want 
our study to cover an enough long - time period, but before our starting point, very few 
mergers and tender offers happened, this is why we choose this time period. And the 
reason why we choose these two M&A deal types is because they are the only ones where 
one company tends to buy another completely. The data satisfy the following criteria: (1) 
both the acquirer and target are public firms in the USA; (2) the deal value reported in SDC 
is more than $1 million; (3) the acquisition is completed; (4) the acquirer owns 100% of the 
target’s share after acquisition and controls less than 50% before acquisition (in an another 
word, the acquirer obtains more than 50% of target’s ownership in the event); (5) utilities 
(Fama-French 8 industry) and financial firms (FF 11 industry) are excluded from the sample 
as they are very highly regulated industries; (6) the sample firms have financial and stock 
return data available from COMPUSTAT and CRSP, respectively. Our final sample consists of 
3,527 deals comprising 2,717 (77.03 percent) mergers and 810 (22.97 percent) tender offers. 
In Table 1, we present a detailed breakdown of the sample firms’ deal characteristics by 
year. There are more mergers and tender offers between 1994 and 2001 due to the 
technology boom and fewer after 2001 because of the slowdown of the economy and 
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especially fewer after the burst of financial crisis. 1120 out of 3,527 (31.76 percent) deals 
are 100% paid for by cash, 1225 (34.73 percent) by stock and 458 (12.99 percent) by a mix 
of cash and stock. Finally, 926 (26.25 percent) M&As are diversified deals, that is to say, the 
acquirer acquires the target in a different industry.   
Table 2 shows the sample distribution by industry defined by Fama – French industry 
classification and the industry distribution holds on a yearly basis as well. The largest 
number of deals are from the business equipment sector (1062) followed by healthcare 
(526) and manufacturing (390), while other sectors represent a much smaller percentage of 
the sample and the smallest number of deals are from chemicals sector (81). 
In Table 3, we report a breakdown of the acquiring firms’ and acquired firms’ deal 
characteristics by leverage respectively. We get this sample after merging data from SDC 
with those from CRSP and COMPUSTAT and classify them by leverage. We define the book 
leverage ratio of firm i in year t by 
 Lit = 
LTdebtit+LTDyr1it
TAit
                                                           (1) 
where LTdebt is the amount of long-term debt that is over one year,  
LTDyr1 is long -term debt due within one year and TA is total asset.  
This Leverage ratio is defined similarly in most recent capital structure papers (e.g., Lemmon, 
Roberts, and Zender,2008; Yang et al., 2013; Graham and Leary,2011; Leary and 
Roberts,2010; Lemmon and Zender,2010). As you can see from this table, ZL firms represent 
complete zero - leverage firms whose leverage ratio is 0%, NZL is near zero - leverage firms 
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with 0% - 2% of debt and 0% included, and L means leveraged firms which have debt of 
more than 2%. Overall, the percentage of each deal characteristic is similar to that 
presented in Table 1. Specifically speaking, for NZL firms and leveraged firms, each 
characteristic term occupies around 20% and 80% of the whole sample respectively, except 
for tender offer (12.24% and 87.76%) and diversification (9.96% and 89.67%, respectively). 
Also, for these 3 levels of leveraged firms, the numbers of merger are all more than those of 
tender offer. And ZL and NZL firms seem to prefer use stock to pay for transactions since 
their numbers of cash and stock are 63 versus 91 and 117 versus 181 respectively while 
leveraged firms tend to pay by cash (665 versus 530). This finding is not consistent with 
what Bae et at. (2014) proved in their paper.  
Summary statistics on bidder and target firm characteristics, acquiring firm governance and 
deal characteristics are provided in Table 4 for ZL, NZL and L firms, respectively. Variable 
definitions are described in Appendix 1.  Firms that are smaller and have higher growth 
opportunities are normally riskier and inclined to make risky investments. Likewise, smaller 
high growth targets are associated with greater uncertainty and hence riskier. We note that 
ZL and NZL acquirers have significantly smaller size and higher growth, as measured by total 
assets and Tobin’s q, than leveraged firms do, and their corresponding targets are also 
smaller and have higher growth. This indicates that unlevered firms pursue acquisitions with 
higher risk, which may cause value deduction and lower returns.  As we expect, unlevered 
bidders tend to acquire unlevered targets since their targets’ median of debt ratio is almost 
0, although the mean of their leverage ratio is 0.072, which may be influenced by extreme 
values. Thus, their M&As choices may be limited. We can also see from the median of free 
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cash flow, leveraged acquirers have significantly less free cash flow than ZL and NZL 
acquirers do, this may partly explain why the former needs to borrow more money and 
have higher leverage ratio than the latter does. On the contrary, leveraged firms’ targets 
have significantly more free cash flow than unlevered firms’ targets do. Moreover, the 
difference of pre-announcement price run up (in %) between L and NZL firms’ targets is 
found to be negative and significant at 1% and 10% level for mean and median, respectively, 
demonstrating that NZL acquirers may have a higher cost of acquisition and it may 
negatively influence their firm performance.     
We also include G-index (Gompers et al., 2003) and E-index (Bebchuk et al., 2009) in our 
analysis to measure the overall governance quality of firms and a lower value for each of 
these indexes indicates higher governance quality. We observe from this table that the 
mean and median values of both indexes for ZL and NZL firms are statistically smaller 
compared to the values for L firms, so unlevered firms have higher governance quality, 
which is consistent with the finding by Erik et al. (2012) that zero-leverage firms’ debt 
initiation decisions are not due to shocks to managerial entrenchment.  
Finally, we note that for deal characteristics, compared with unlevered firms, leveraged 
firms are relatively more likely to pay for deals with cash, acquire targets in a different 






4.1. Event Study Analysis  
For short-term announcement period performance analysis, we use event study 
methodology to get announcement returns for ZL and non-ZL acquirers, and test if there is 
any significant difference between their returns to examine if ZL buyers underperform non-
ZL buyers during the announcement period under the influence of their different acquisition 
decisions.  For the event study estimation period, we keep the default value in Eventus - 
using (-255, -46) and use 30 days prior to announcement date and 30 days after 
announcement date (-30, +30) as the event period. Alternative event windows are (-42, 42), 
(-42, 3), (-1, 0), (0, 1), (-1, 1) and (-2, 2). 
The daily market model (CRSP Value Weighted Index) is used to estimate the cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) around the announcement date for each acquirer. CRSP equally 
weighted returns all also used but the results are similar so that they are not reported.  
CARi,t for firm i over the period of t is calculated as:  
 CARi, t = Σ Ri, t – E (Ri, t)   (2)  
Where Ri, t is the actual return on firm i at time t, 
E (Ri, t) is the expected return on firm i at time t.  
In order to more precisely investigate if non-ZL acquiring firms outperform debt-free ones, 
we create matched leveraged bidders with ZL and NZL bidders based on three criteria: same 
Fama-French industry classification, within (-20%, 20%) range of the size and closest book-
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market ratio (B/M). After applying event study to get CARs, we compare the difference on 
the CARs between zero-debt and matched levered acquirers, NZL and matched levered 
acquirers, respectively.  
4.2. Regression Analysis of Short-Term Performance  
To further test the difference between ZL and non- ZL bidders’ CARs in a cross-section 
setting, we implement ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models with year fixed effect 
and industry fixed effect. Acquirer’s 3-day CARs (CAR-1, +1) is the dependent variable and our 
main variable of interest is debt ratio or debt ratio (dummy) which takes the value of 1 if the 
buyer’s debt ratio is over 2% and 0 otherwise. The independent variables consist of bidder 
and target characteristics (log of total assets, Tobin’s q, free cash flow and price run up for 
target firm), deal characteristics (tender offer dummy, cash dummy, diversification dummy, 
relative deal size and industry M&A) and governance quality measured by G-index or E-
index. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix 1. The regression model for firm i, time 
t is as follows:  
CARi,t = α + β1 Debtdummy i,t + β2 Bidder Characteristics i,t + β3 Target Characteristics i,t + β4 
Deal Characteristics i,t + β5 Governance i,t + Year fixed effect + Industry fixed effect + εi,t         (3)              
Where α and β are the parameters and ε i,t is the error term.  
And we also control for bidder management quality in our regression models, as it is an 
important factor to determine the success of a M&A deal as well as acquisition returns. 
Higher management quality is more likely to benefit shareholder wealth maximization 
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(Bhabra and Hossain, 2017). We employ operating income growth rate for the preceding 
three years to measure management quality (Masulis et al., 2007), and followed Morck et al. 
(1990), we define industry adjusted operating income growth rate as (EBITDAt−1 - 
EBITDAt−4)/EBITDAt−4. The regression model for firm i, time t is as follows: 
CARi,t = α + β1 Debtdummyi,t + β2 Operating Income Growth Ratei,t +  β3 Bidder 
Characteristics i,t + β4 Target Characteristics i,t + β5 Deal Characteristics i,t + β6 Governance i,t 
+ Year fixed effect + Industry fixed effect + ε i,t                                                                              (4) 
Where α and β are the parameters and ε i,t is the error term. 
Next, we regress CAR-1,+1 on the same independent variables excluding governance indexes                   
as the numbers of observations will be increased a lot. All the model specifications are 
similar with above-mentioned and we also control bidder management quality. 
4.3. Long-Term Post-Acquisition Operating Performance Analysis 
For the long-term performance analysis, we first examine the operating performance of 
acquiring firms during 3-year and 5-year periods after M&A announcements. The operating 
performance is measured as the return on assets (ROA), which is the ratio of earnings 
before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) scaled by total assets. Tests 
include both industry and matched-firm adjusted ROAs. Industry adjusted ROA is computed 
as acquirer’s ROA - industry average ROA. For matched-firm adjusted ROA, we match each 
of our sample firm with a control firm which is a non-event firm, meaning it did not 
undertake any M&A activity during the period of 5-year before and 5-year after the sample 
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firm’s event date and the 3 matching criteria are: same Fama-French industry classification, 
within (-20%, 20%) range of the size and closest book-market ratio (B/M). Matched-firm 
adjusted ROA is calculated as acquirer’s ROA – matched firm’s ROA (Barber and Lyon, 1996).  
And then through mean test analysis, we can see if the sample firm outperforms or 
underperforms industry average and the matched - firm for ZL, NZL and leveraged firms 
respectively and if there is any significant difference on the two types of ROAs between ZL 
and non-ZL firms.  
Similar to the short-term performance regression analysis, next we implement 4 ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regression models with year fixed effect and industry fixed effect to 
conduct the long-term operating performance regression analysis. Acquirer’s 3-year or 5-
year post acquisition industry adjusted ROAs is the dependent variable for two of the 
regression models and matched-firm adjusted ROAs is the dependent variable for the other 
two models. Also, our main variable of interest is debt ratio (dummy) which takes the value 
of 1 if the buyer’s debt ratio is over 2% and 0 otherwise. The control variables consist of 
bidder and target characteristics (log of total assets, Tobin’s q), deal characteristics (tender 
offer dummy, cash dummy, diversification dummy) and governance quality measured by G-
index or E-index. The regression model for firm i, time t is as follows:  
ROA i,t = α + β1 Debtdummy i,t + β2 Bidder Characteristics i,t + β3 Target Characteristics i,t + 
β4 Deal Characteristics i,t + β5 Governance i,t + Year fixed effect + Industry fixed effect + εi,t (5)                    




4.4. Long-Term Post-Acquisition Stock Performance Analysis 
To perform the long-term performance analysis, we also conduct 3-year and 5-year long-
term event studies by employing the buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) approach to 
examine monthly abnormal returns. Following Mitchell and Stafford (2000), we use the 
following formula to calculate BHAR for firm i in month t where benchmark is our matched 
non-event sample in the previous operating performance analysis: 
                                         BHARi,t = ∏(1 + 𝑅𝑖𝑡) − ∏(1 + 𝑅 𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘, 𝑡)                               (6) 
Again, we apply the t test to investigate if the long-term stock performance of bidder is 
better than that of the matched non-event firm for ZL, NZL and leveraged firms respectively 
and if there is any significant difference on BHARs between ZL and non-ZL firms.  
For the regression analysis, the approach and models are same as what we use in the 
operating performance regression analysis while the only difference is that the dependent 
variable becomes acquirer’s 3-year or 5-year post-acquisition BHARs.  
5. Empirical Results 
5.1. Analysis of Short-Term Announcement Returns 
First, we examine the short-term stock price reaction to the M&A announcement captured 
by CARs for acquiring firms. Table 5 presents the results for the different event windows for 
the full sample (panel A) and the matched sample (panel B).  
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Both of panel A and panel B show CAR is positively correlated to leverage so CARs of 
leveraged acquirers are significantly higher than those of ZL and NZL ones in all windows 
and the differences between L and ZL, L and NZL are statistically significant at the 1% level 
for all the window reported. For example, CAR-1,+1 of L bidders is -0.33% for the full sample 
and -0.54% for the matched sample while the corresponding values for the ZL bidders are all 
-2.56%.  
This means ZL and NZL buyers underperform leveraged buyers around the announcement 
date under the influence of their different acquisition decisions, which is consistent with our 
hypothesis that the M&A decisions of ZL firms may not be optimal as their target may be 
limited to zero leveraged or near zero leveraged firms and this will negatively affect their 
announcement returns.  
We estimate 6 ordinary least squares regressions with acquirers’ CARs-1,+1 as the dependent 
variable and in all regression models, we include the governance (G-index) or entrenchment 
(E-index) variables as well as control for year and industry fixed effects. The regression 
results are reported in Table 6 and the results with the control variable – bidder 
management quality are showed in model V and VI. In model IV and VI, our main variable of 
interest is acquiring firm’s debt ratio while in the other 4 models, the main variable is debt 
ratio dummy which equals 1 if bidder’s debt ratio is over 2% but takes a value of 0 if the 
ratio is 0% in model I and model V and 0 if the ratio is within 0% to 2% in model II and III.   
The debt ratio dummies are significantly positive in the 4 models and significant at 5% level 
in model I and V and at 10% level in model II and III, meanwhile the debt ratios are also 
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positive and significant at 1% in model IV and VI. This robustly proves that the CAR increases 
with the increase of the debt ratio no matter controlling for the bidder management quality 
or not. Among bidder characteristics, the results in 5 out of 6 models suggest that acquirers’ 
size has a significant positive effect on the announcement return. In model VI, free cash 
flow is significantly positively related to CAR-1,+1, which means more profitable firms gain 
larger returns and this is consistent with existing empirical evidence. Among target 
characteristics we note that those buyers who take over smaller and lower future growth 
target firms earn better announcement period returns. Finally, among deal characteristics, 
we observe that in all the 6 models the cash dummy and relative deal value are consistently 
significant at 1% and 10% level respectively, and the former is positively associated with 
CARs while the latter is negative. This result robustly demonstrates that cash acquisitions 
benefit from higher abnormal returns and the findings in Table 3 and 4 show that leveraged 
acquirers are more likely to pay for the deal with cash so we propose this may partly explain 
why L buyers outperform ZL and NZL buyers. Also, smaller deal value has more positive 
effect on bidders’ short-term returns, being consistent with the result about the 
relationship between targets’ size and CARs and consistent with existing empirical evidence.  
Table 7 displays the regression results without controlling for corporate governance and the 
numbers of observations are increased a lot. All the other variables are same as those in 
Table 6 and the model specifications are also similar with those in Table 6. The results with 
the control variable – bidder management quality are showed in model IV, V and VI, and in 
models I, II,  IV and V,  debt ratio dummy equals 1 if bidder’s debt ratio is over 2% and takes 
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a value of 0 if the ratio is 0% in model I and IV while 0 if the ratio is within 0% to 2% in 
model II and V.  
The regression results are similar with the previous ones but there are some differences. 
The significant levels of debt dummy are higher than before, the bidder management 
quality becomes significantly positively related to the announcement returns and the result 
for bidder’s size is not significant in this table.  As for target characteristics, debt ratio and 
free cash flow become significantly positive at 10% and 5% level respectively in most of the 
models, which means if bidders acquire targets which have higher debt ratio and more free 
cash flow, they will obtain higher returns. Since we observe in Table 4 that L firms tend to 
buy higher leveraged targets and buy those with more free cash flow, it may partly illustrate 
why L acquirers outperform ZL and NZL acquirers.    
The overall evidence in Table 6 and Table 7 is also consistent with our prediction, clearly 
indicating that levered firms realize greater short-term gains than unlevered firms do.      
5.2. Analysis of Long-Term Post-Acquisition Performance  
Bae and Chung (2014) find that zero-leverage firms’ post-acquisition stock performances 
are not worse than those of matched firms, so for further study purpose, we examine their 
difference of performances during the post-acquisition long-term period as well.  Table 8 
and Table 9 present the evidence from this investigation for operating performance. 
Table 8 displays the univariate mean test results. In the industry adjusted performance, we 
observe (for 5-year ROA) that the ZL and NZL acquirers significantly underperform their 
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industry mean benchmark by 4.19% and 3.36% respectively while the leveraged sample 
outperforms their industry benchmark by 0.59% and is also significant at 1% level. Both of 
the differences between L and ZL bidders and between L and NZL sample are around 4% 
and statistically significant at 1% level. The trend is similar for the 3-year ROAs. In the match 
firm adjusted performance, for 5-year ROA, levered firms significantly outperform their 
paired non-event control firms by 2.70% although the results for ZL and L samples are not 
significant. Similar with our findings above, the differences are also significant while the 
differences for 3-year ROA are not significant.  It generally confirms that zero-leverage and 
near zero leveraged bidders’ subprime operating performance in the long-run following an 
acquisition event.  
In Table 9 we report the cross-sectional regression analysis of 5-year and 3-year adjusted 
ROAs.  In panel A, acquirer’s 5-year post-acquisition industry adjusted ROA is the dependent 
variable for model I and II and 5-year matched-firm adjusted ROA is the dependent variable 
for the other two models. Our main variable of interest is debt ratio (dummy), which is 
consistently positive and significant in all four models. This is consistent with the result in 
Table 8 that the difference of adjusted ROA between leveraged and unlevered acquirers is 
significantly positive. We also observe that bidder’s size and Tobin’s q are positively related 
to ROAs and significant at 1% level, and mergers enable the firms to earn better industry 
adjusted ROAs than tender offers do.  Again, consistent with our findings in the short-term 
performance analysis, cash acquisitions robustly positively affect adjusted ROAs and 
significant at the 1% level in each model. Meanwhile, all the model specifications, variables 
and results are about the same for the analysis of 3-year adjusted ROAs in panel B.   
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Overall, the evidence robustly supports our hypothesis that L firms also realize better long-
term operating performance than ZL and NZL firms do.   
Apart from operating performance, we also report the analysis results for stock 
performance in Table 10. Panel A shows 3-year and 5-year average BHARs for ZL, NZL and L 
firms respectively, as well as the differences between them. We can see (for 3-year BHARs) 
that both of NZL and L acquirers significantly underperform their matched benchmarks, but 
the difference is not significant. For 5-year BHARs, ZL and NZL bidders underperform by 
104.04% and 162.13% their matched firms respectively, while leveraged bidders 
underperform 88.71% less than NZL sample does and the difference is significant at 5% level, 
once again proving the levered buyers’ superior performance in the long-run.  
Next, we present the analysis result in a cross-section setting in panel B. The dependent 
variables are 3-year BHAR (model I, II) and 5-year BHAR (model III, IV). Again, our main 
variable of interest is debt ratio dummy, while equals 1 when the acquirer’s debt ratio is 
over 2% and 0 otherwise. We find that acquirers which have bigger size and lower growth 
opportunity gain higher long-term stock performance and the results are significant in all of 
the 4 models. Also, consistent with our pervious findings and the existing empirical evidence, 
target’s Tobin’s q and tender offer dummy have a negative relation with 5-year stock 
returns and 3-year stock returns, respectively. However, the debt ratio dummy is not 
significant in each model, indicating debt ratio is not related to long-term stock 
performance and there is no significant difference on the long-term stock returns between 
levered and unlevered bidders. We suppose this inconsistent result may be due to the fact 
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that the stock market is affected by many factors in the long-run, which will make the 
association become weak between leverage and stock returns.      
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we conduct a comprehensive study of the M&A decisions of zero-leverage 
firms and the influence on their short-term and long-term firm performance using a sample 
of 3,527 completed US mergers and tender offers during the period of 1985 to 2015. Our 
results demonstrate that ZL acquirers experience significantly more negative announcement 
abnormal returns than leveraged acquirers, and this finding is robust to using matched 
sample and controlling for bidder management quality, corporate governance quality, and 
bidder, target and deal characteristics. ZL acquiring firms also display significant subprime 
industry and matched firm adjusted operating performance during the 3-year and 5-year 
post-acquisition periods, and it is robust to the methodology and benchmark used. Results 
using 3-year and 5-year buy-and-hold abnormal stock returns are not consistent with our 
above-mentioned findings, as the stock market is affected by many factors in the long-run.  
The underperformance of ZL buyers can be primarily explained by the following findings. 
First, we note that ZL acquirers have significantly smaller size and higher growth than 
leveraged firms do and their corresponding targets are also smaller and have higher growth, 
indicating that they are riskier and inclined to pursue acquisitions with higher risk, which do 
cause value deduction and lower returns. Consistent with our hypothesis that ZL firms’ 
M&As choices may be limited, we find unlevered bidders do tend to acquire unlevered 
targets. Also, leveraged firms’ targets have significantly more free cash flow than unlevered 
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firms’ targets do, which can generate more value-enhancing acquisitions for leveraged firms. 
Moreover, the difference of pre-announcement price run up (in %) between leveraged and 
near zero-leverage firms’ targets is found to be negative and significant, so near ZL acquirers 
may have a higher cost of acquisition and it may negatively influence their firm performance. 
Finally, unlevered firms are relatively less likely to pay for deals with cash while cash 
acquisitions earn higher returns.   
In conclusion, the evidence robustly supports our hypothesis that zero-leverage firms 
underperform leveraged firms in the short-term announcement period as well as the long-
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Variable                                                 Definitions 
Panel A: leverage dummy 
Debt ratio dummy variable               1 for leveraged firms and 0 otherwise  
Panel B: bidder and target characteristics 
Firm size                                                Log of book value of total assets  
Tobin’s q                                                Market value of assets over book value of assets: 
                                                                (book value of debt + share price × common shares outstanding)/total assets 
Leverage                                                Book value of debts / total assets   
Free cash flow                                      Operating income before depreciation – interest expense – income taxes – 
                                                                capital expenditure, scaled by book value of total assets 
Price run-up (target)                            Cumulative abnormal return for the period (−60,−10) with CRSP value 
                                                                 weighted return used for market adjustment 
Panel C: deal characteristics 
Tender offer                                          Equals 1 if flagged as a tender offer in SDC, 0 otherwise 
Cash                                                        Equals 1 for totally cash financed deals, 0 otherwise 
Diversification                                       Equals 1 if target and acquirer are not in the same Fama-French industry, 0  
                                                                 otherwise 
Relative deal size                                  Deal value (SDC)/ market value of equity 
Industry M&A                                        Value of all corporate acquisitions worth $1 million or more for each year  
                                                                 and Fama-French industry divided by the total book value of assets of all                            
                                                                 Compustat firms in same Fama-French industry and year (target industry) 
Panel D: bidder management quality 
Operating income growth rate          Industry adjusted operating income growth rate is defined as 
                                                                (EBITDAt−1 − EBITDAt−4)/EBITDAt−4 
Panel E: governance indices 
G-index                                                  From Gompers et. al. (2003)  
E-index                                                   From Bebchuk et al. (2009)
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Table 1 Sample Description by Year 
This table reports description of 3,527 completed US transactions from the Securities Data Corporation’s 
(SDC) U.S. Merger and Acquisitions database, covering dates from January 1, 1985 to December 31, 2015. It 
provides a detailed breakdown of the sample firms’ deal characteristics by year. We use the following 
criteria: (1) both the acquirer and target are public firms in the USA; (2) the deal value reported in SDC is 
more than $1 million; (3) the acquisition is completed; (4) the acquirer owns 100% of the target’s share after 
acquisition and controls less than 50% before acquisition; (5) utilities (FF industry 8) and financial firms (FF 
industry 11) are excluded from the sample; (6) the sample firms have financial and stock return data 
available from COMPUSTAT and CRSP, respectively. 
Year Total  Merger 
Tender 
Offer Cash Stock  Mixed Diversification  
 
1985 90 45 45 44 26 5 45 
1986 101 47 54 57 15 10 39 
1987 88 54 34 43 17 9 31 
1988 102 55 47 53 18 3 30 
1989 72 47 25 28 28 7 24 
1990 61 48 13 16 26 4 15 
1991 57 45 12 8 23 13 17 
1992 54 44 10 10 25 7 14 
1993 70 56 14 18 28 11 19 
1994 132 107 25 30 67 17 41 
1995 172 136 36 35 93 13 49 
1996 189 151 38 30 84 18 55 
1997 213 166 47 34 99 16 52 
1998 276 229 47 50 130 20 67 
1999 256 199 57 58 115 26 66 
2000 231 184 47 39 109 26 63 
2001 178 145 33 39 76 26 43 
2002 104 74 30 40 32 14 22 
2003 103 82 21 29 35 19 18 
2004 105 95 10 42 27 17 26 
2005 115 106 9 44 23 30 20 
2006 107 101 6 58 16 17 24 
2007 111 88 23 58 16 23 33 
2008 76 52 24 35 15 11 18 
2009 77 58 19 25 18 18 13 
2010 78 59 19 50 11 9 15 
2011 45 36 9 20 7 11 13 
2012 61 51 10 37 8 10 14 
2013 58 46 12 33 6 6 9 
2014 63 50 13 24 19 15 13 
2015 82 61 21 33 13 27 18 




Table 2 Sample Distribution by Industry  
This table shows the sample distribution of the 3,527 completed US transactions by industry defined by Fama - French industry classification and 
the industry distribution holds on a yearly basis as well. Utilities (FF industry 8) and financial firms (FF industry 11) are excluded from the sample. 
 
 
FF1                           
Consumer  
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1985 9 4 18 3 7 9 7 13 8 12 90 
1986 9 10 25 5 5 10 2 12 5 18 101 
1987 7 6 20 4 3 18 4 8 6 12 88 
1988 6 6 20 4 3 21 7 17 3 15 102 
1989 7 4 7 3 2 19 7 6 9 8 72 
1990 1 1 8 5 0 14 6 12 6 8 61 
1991 5 1 7 3 0 15 4 2 10 10 57 
1992 7 1 7 2 0 13 3 4 10 7 54 
1993 8 0 9 1 2 13 6 6 18 7 70 
1994 4 3 16 11 1 29 13 13 31 11 132 
1995 8 5 19 5 6 39 13 18 37 22 172 
1996 4 5 20 9 3 41 19 28 36 24 189 
1997 12 5 27 16 4 53 22 27 27 20 213 
1998 13 5 33 18 7 74 24 41 33 28 276 
1999 11 8 27 6 9 99 31 17 24 24 256 
2000 13 2 26 9 3 95 17 20 18 28 231 
2001 11 3 10 17 2 75 10 10 22 18 178 
2002 4 0 5 5 2 46 6 6 16 14 104 
2003 6 2 7 6 0 51 3 4 17 7 103 
2004 9 1 7 8 3 38 4 7 14 14 105 
2005 4 1 5 7 2 41 11 7 28 9 115 
2006 6 3 7 8 1 39 5 8 17 13 107 
2007 2 1 11 5 3 44 6 10 19 10 111 
2008 0 1 6 2 2 27 6 4 21 7 76 
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2009 4 0 5 7 1 28 6 2 14 10 77 
2010 2 2 8 7 1 26 5 4 18 5 78 
2011 0 1 8 6 1 14 4 3 4 4 45 
2012 3 3 3 2 2 18 4 4 12 10 61 
2013 3 0 4 2 1 17 5 6 17 3 58 
2014 6 0 7 4 4 12 3 4 13 10 63 
2015 5 3 8 5 1 24 4 6 13 13 82 














Table 3 Sample Distribution by Deal Characteristics and Leverage  
 
This table shows a breakdown of the acquiring firms’ and acquired firms’ deal characteristics by leverage. 
We get this sample after merging data from SDC with those from CRSP and COMPUSTAT and classify 
them by leverage. ZL firms represent complete zero - leverage firms whose leverage ratio is 0%, NZL is 
near zero - leverage firms with 0% - 2% of debt and 0% included, and L means leveraged firms that have 









L firms  
[>2%] 
 
Acquirers 2265 215 398 1863 
Merger 1714 184 331 1379 
Tender Offer 539 31 66 473 
Cash 782 63 117 665 
Stock  714 91 181 530 
Mixed 314 34 53 261 
Diversification  542 23 54 486 
Targets 1873 417 641 1232 
Merger 1399 318 494 905 
Tender Offer 466 99 146 320 
Cash 665 183 277 388 
Stock  596 158 243 353 
Mixed 267 43 76 191 
Diversification  433 81 125 308 
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Table 4 Descriptive Statistics 
This table presents summary statistics on bidder and target firm characteristics, acquiring firm governance and deal characteristics for ZL, NZL and leveraged 
firms, respectively. Variable definitions are described in Appendix 1.  *, **, *** represent significant levels at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.  
     
 
ZL firms NZL firms L firms Difference [L-ZL] Difference [L-NZL] 
 
mean  median  mean  median  mean  median  mean  median  mean  median  
 
Bidder Characteristics  
    
 
     Total assets  
(in year 2015, $mil) 5160.400 614.834 3803.300 586.508 15387.900 2904.260 10227.40*** 2289.426*** 11584.600*** 2317.752*** 
Debt ratio 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.273 0.237 
         
0.273*** 0.237*** 0.270*** 0.237*** 
Tobin's q 3.821 2.016 3.461 2.015 1.749 1.333        -2.072*** -0.683*** -1.712*** -0.682*** 
Free cash flow 0.038 0.080 0.036 0.064 0.037 0.049 -0.001 -0.031***    0.001 -0.015*** 
 
Governance indices            
G-index  7.770 8.000 8.173 8.000 9.212 9.000 1.442*** 1.000*** 1.039*** 1.000*** 
E-index  1.633 2.000 1.852 2.000 2.117 2.000 0.484*** 0.000*** 0.265** 0.000** 
 
Target Characteristics 
          Total assets 
(in year 2015, $mil) 317.564 89.245 260.051 81.256 1121.003 219.835 803.439*** 130.590*** 860.952*** 138.579*** 
Debt ratio 0.072 0.001 0.072 0.004 0.217 0.153 0.146*** 0.152*** 0.145*** 0.149*** 
Tobin's q 2.322 1.438 2.330 1.530 1.718 1.223 -0.604** -0.214** -0.612*** -0.307*** 
Free cash flow -0.066 -0.001 -0.037 0.017 -0.005 0.031 0.061*** 0.032*** 0.032** 0.014 
Price run up (in %) 0.085 0.085 0.103 0.088 0.057 0.061 -0.028 -0.024 -0.046*** -0.027* 
 
Deal Characteristics  
          
Tender offer (dummy) 0.144 0.000 0.164 0.000 0.254 0.000 0.111*** 
       
0.000***    0.089***      0.000*** 
Cash (dummy) 0.293 0.000 0.291 0.000 0.357 0.000      0.066*   0.000*        0.064**      0.000** 
Diversification (dummy) 0.107 0.000 0.136 0.000 0.262 0.000 0.155*** 
       
0.000***    0.126*** 
       
0.000*** 
Relative deal size  0.380 0.154 0.380 0.153 0.354 0.151  -0.026      -0.004  -0.026       -0.002 
Observations  
 
215                 398 
 
         1863 
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Table 5 Event Study Announcement Returns 
This table reports the event study CARs around the announcement date for acquiring firms, 
where the estimation window is 255 trading days ending 46 days before the announcement 
date. CARs are calculated based on CRSP value weighted returns and results with CRSP equally 
weighted returns are similar.  Panel A exhibits the announcement returns for the full sample 
while panel B demonstrates the results for matched sample where the leveraged bidders are 
matched with ZL and NZL bidders, respectively, based on industry, size and book to market ratio. 
*, **, *** represent significant levels at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
 
Panel A: full sample  
 




                 
ZL firms 
 










(-42,+42) -7.45%***  -8.40%***  -1.61%*** 5.84%***   6.79%*** 
(-42,-3) -0.37%      -0.75%    0.96%** 1.33%***   1.71%*** 
(-1,0) -1.33%***   -1.61%*** -0.45%*** 0.88%***   1.16%*** 
(0,+1) -2.91%***   -2.78%***   -0.36%** 2.55%***   2.42%*** 
(-1,+1) -2.56%***   -2.54%***   -0.33%* 2.23%***   2.21%*** 
(-2,+2) -2.74%***   -2.82%*** -0.49%*** 2.25%***   2.33%*** 
Observations  215 398 1863 
   








Matched    













(-42,+42) -7.45%*** -1.20%** 6.25%***   -8.4%*** 0.52%** 8.92%*** 
(-42,-3) -0.37%    1.77% 2.14%***   -0.75%    3.03%** 3.78%*** 
(-1,0) -1.33%***   -0.45% 0.88%***   -1.61%***   -0.66%** 0.95%*** 
(0,+1) -2.91%***  -0.49%** 2.42%***   -2.78%*** -0.89%*** 1.89%*** 
(-1,+1) -2.56%***   -0.54% 2.02%***   -2.54%*** -0.91%*** 1.63%*** 
(-2,+2) -2.74%*** -0.63%** 2.11%***   -2.82%*** -1.05%*** 1.77%*** 







Table 6 Announcement Returns Regression Analysis 
This table exhibits the regression analysis of acquirer announcement returns. The dependent variable is acquirer 3-day CAR-1,+1. The results with 
the control variable – bidder management quality are showed in model V and VI. In model IV and VI, our main variable of interest is acquiring 
firm’s debt ratio while in the other 4 models, the main variable is debt ratio dummy which equals 1 if bidder’s debt ratio is  over 2% but takes a 
value of 0 if the ratio is 0% in model I and model V and 0 if the ratio is within 0% to 2% in model II and III. All the variable definitions are 
described in Appendix 1. T- stats are showed in the parentheses and *, **, *** indicate significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
 
I II III IV V VI 





(2.47) (1.65) (1.76) 
 
(2.33) 
 Debt ratio  








Bidder management quality  
      Operating income growth rate  
   
0.0005 0.0005 
     
(0.93) (1.00) 
Bidder Characteristics  
      Log (total assets)  0.003* 0.003 0.004* 0.004** 0.004* 0.005** 
 
(1.70) (1.56) (1.94) (2.24) (1.83) (2.41) 
Tobin's q  0.000 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.001 
 
(0.23) (0.84) (1.08) (1.11) (0.11) (0.99) 
Free cash flow  0.042 0.024 0.026 0.043 0.063 0.063* 
 
(1.07) (0.65) (0.70) (1.15) (1.58) (1.66) 
Target Characteristics 
      Log (total assets) -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.007*** 
 
(-3.10) (-3.46) (-3.56) (-3.56) (-3.07) (-3.59) 
Debt ratio 0.008 0.008 0.010 0.006 0.005 0.004 
 
(0.76) (0.85) (0.97) (0.61) (0.44) (0.41) 




(-2.47) (-2.93) (-3.13) (-2.86) (-2.40) (-2.86) 
Free cash flow 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.015 0.012 0.012 
 
(0.78) (0.84) (0.77) (0.79) (0.56) (0.64) 
Price run up  0.473 0.723 0.461 0.467 0.524 0.524 
 
(0.47) (0.74) (0.48) (0.49) (0.52) (0.55) 
Deal Characteristics  
      Tender offer (dummy) 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.34) (0.33) (0.33) (0.38) (0.20) (0.22) 
Cash (dummy) 0.021*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.018*** 0.016*** 
 
(3.59) (3.11) (3.10) (2.83) (2.99) (2.84) 
Diversification (dummy) -0.005 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.006 -0.009 
 
(-0.84) (-1.23) (-1.34) (-1.37) (-1.05） (-1.53） 
Relative deal size  -0.017* -0.015* -0.015* -0.020** -0.015* -0.018** 
 
(-1.91) (-1.81) (-1.78) (-2.35) (-1.76) (-2.13) 
Industry M&A -0.227 -0.070 -0.106 -0.052 -0.391 -0.259 
 
(-1.06) (-0.22) (-0.32) (-0.16) (-1.09) (-1.16) 
Governance indices  

















Year fixed  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry fixed  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Adjusted R2 0.096 0.088 0.090 0.102 0.095 0.100 







Table 7 Announcement Returns Regression Analysis 
This table shows the regression results of acquirer announcement returns without controlling for corporate governance. The dependent variable 
is acquirer 3-day CAR-1,+1. The results with the control variable – bidder management quality are showed in model IV, V and VI. In model III and VI, 
our main variable of interest is acquiring firm’s debt ratio while in the other 4 models, the main variable is debt ratio dummy which equals 1 if 
bidder’s debt ratio is over 2% but takes a value of 0 if the ratio is 0% in model I and model IV and 0 if the ratio is within 0% to 2% in model II and 
V. All the variable definitions are described in Appendix 1. T- stats are showed in the parentheses and *, **, *** indicate significance at 0.10, 
0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
 
 
I II III IV V VI 

















Bidder management quality  
      Operating income growth rate  
   
0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 
    
(3.59) (3.63) (3.51) 
Bidder Characteristics  
      Log (total assets)  0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.28) (0.45) (0.83) (0.25) (0.29) (0.56) 
Tobin's q  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(-0.04) (-0.22) (-0.18) (0.36) (026) (0.33) 
Free cash flow  0.009 0.020 0.033 0.031 0.035 0.044* 
 
(0.36) (0.83) (1.34) (1.14) (1.32) (1.65) 
Target Characteristics 
      Log (total assets)  -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 
(-3.50) (-3.59) (-3.76) (-3.22) (-3.21) (-3.36) 
Debt ratio 0.018* 0.017* 0.012 0.018* 0.016* 0.013 
 






Tobin's q -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 
(-4.48) (-5.05) (-4.95) (-4.44) (-4.51) (-4.44) 
Free cash flow 0.040*** 0.033** 0.032** 0.039** 0.031** 0.031** 
 
(2.57) (2.15) (2.07) (2.41) (1.99) (1.96) 
Price run up  -0.509 -0.514 -0.490 -0.616 -0.313 -0.299 
 
(-0.59) (-0.62) (-0.59) (-0.69) (-0.36) (-0.34) 
Deal Characteristics  
      Tender offer (dummy) 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.67) (0.29) (0.31) (0.26) (0.03) (0.06) 
Cash (dummy) 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.022*** 
 
(4.41) (4.64) (4.33) (4.38) (4.50) (4.29) 
Diversification (dummy) -0.004 -0.006 -0.005 -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 
 
(-0.84) (-1.16) (-0.97) (-0.41) (-0.77) (-0.62) 
Relative deal size  -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.014*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.013*** 
 
(-3.83) (-3.76) (-4.28) (-3.68) (-3.65) (-4.04) 
Industry M&A -0.219 -0.220 -0.200 -0.259 -0.235 -0.227 
 
(-1.00) (-1.03) (-0.94) (-1.16) (-1.09) (-1.06) 
Year fixed  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry fixed  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Adjusted R2 0.108 0.102 0.110 0.105 0.090 0.095 
Number of observations                       1298 1387 1387 1206 1283 1283 
40 
 
Table 8 Univariate Analysis of Long-Term Post-Acquisition Operating Performance 
This table reports 3-year and 5-year post-acquisition average ROAs and the univariate mean test 
results. ROAs are computed using the methodology from Barber and Lyon (1996). *, **, *** 
indicate significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.  
 
 





Industry adjusted ROA 
     3-year -5.04%*** -3.95%*** 0.30%* 5.34%*** 4.25%*** 
5-year -4.19%*** -3.36%*** 0.59%*** 4.78%*** 3.95%*** 
Observations  189 320 1686 
  
      Match firm adjusted ROA 
     3-year 0.46% 1.39% 2.42%*** 1.97% 1.04% 
5-year 0.23% 0.71% 2.70%*** 2.47%** 1.98%** 
Observations  91 149 852 




























   
Table 9 Regression Analysis of Long-Term Post-Acquisition Operating Performance 
This table shows the evidence from the analysis of post-acquisition operating performance. 
Panel A displays the results for 5-year performance analysis and panel B presents those for 3-
year analysis. The dependent variables are acquirer’s industry adjusted ROA in model I and II 
and match firm adjusted ROA in model III and IV. Our main variable of interest is debt ratio 
(dummy) which takes the value of 1 if the buyer’s debt ratio is over 2% and 0 otherwise. T- stats 
are showed in the parentheses and *, **, *** indicate significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, 
respectively.  
 
Panel A: 5-year operating performance  
 
 
I II III IV 
Debt ratio (dummy) 0.010* 0.015** 0.025*** 0.029*** 
 
(1.65) (2.41) (2.74) (3.14) 
Bidder Characteristics  
    Log (total assets) 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 
 
(16.22) (15.65) (3.06) (2.73) 
Tobin's q  0.016*** 0.016*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 
 
(13.70) (13.41) (8.05) (8.19) 
Target Characteristics 
    Log (total assets) 0.001 0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 
(0.41) (0.59) (-0.41) (-0.34) 
Tobin's q 0.003 0.003 -0.004 -0.004 
 
(0.90) (0.93) (-1.01) (-1.03) 
Deal Characteristics  
    Tender offer (dummy) -0.010** -0.013*** 0.003 0.001 
 
(-2.21) (-2.71) (0.49) (0.15) 
Cash (dummy) 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 
 
(6.54) (6.54) (4.11) (4.08) 
Diversification (dummy) -0.007 -0.007 -0.009 -0.009 
 
(-1.58) (-1.57) (-1.27) (-1.27) 
Governance indices  

















Year fixed  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry fixed  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Adjusted R2 0.220 0.212 0.066 0.064 








Panel B: 3-year operating performance  
 
 
I II III IV 
Debt ratio (dummy) 0.011 0.016** 0.021* 0.023** 
 
(1.61) (2.26) (1.88) (2.10) 
Bidder Characteristics  
    log (total assets) 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 
 
(13.78) (13.54) (4.15) (3.98) 
Tobin's q  0.013*** 0.013*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 
(10.21) (9.78) (4.12) (4.22) 
Target Characteristics 
    log (total assets) 0.001 0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 
(0.41) (0.59) (-0.41) (-0.35) 
Tobin's q 0.003 0.003 -0.004 -0.005 
 
(0.90) (0.93) (-1.01) (-1.08) 
Deal Characteristics  
    Tender offer (dummy) -0.008 -0.010* -0.002 -0.004 
 
(-1.47) (-1.78) (-0.24) (-0.52) 
Cash (dummy) 0.037*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.034*** 
 
(6.74) (6.64) (4.25) (4.17) 
Diversification 
(dummy) -0.001 -0.002 -0.004 -0.004 
 
(-0.23) (-0.29) (-0.48) (-0.46) 
Governance indices  

















Year fixed  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry fixed  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Adjusted R2 0.221 0.212 0.055 0.052 









Table 10 Long-Term Post-Acquisition Stock Performance 
This table presents long-term post-acquisition stock performance analysis results. Panel A shows 
3-year and 5-year average BHARs for ZL, NZL and L firms respectively, as well as the differences 
between them. BHARs are computed using the methodology from Mitchell and Stafford (2000).  
Panel B demonstrates the differences in a cross-section setting. The dependent variable is 3-
year BHAR in model I, II and 5-year BHAR in model III, IV and our main variable of interest is debt 
ratio (dummy) which takes the value of 1 if the buyer’s debt ratio is over 2% and 0 otherwise. T- 
stats are showed in the parentheses and *, **, *** indicate significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, 
respectively.  
 
Panel A: univariate analysis 
 






     3-year  -31.73%   -64.94%* -51.62%*** -19.89%    13.32% 
5-year -104.04%** -162.13%*** -73.42%***   30.62%    88.71%** 
Observations  75 135 763 
   
Panel B: regression analysis  
 
I II III IV 
Debt ratio (dummy) -0.740 -0.839 0.641 0.864 
 
( -1.59) ( -1.58) (0.91) (1.23) 
Bidder Characteristics  
    log (total assets) 0.435*** 0.367** 0.571***  0.502** 
 
(2.68) (2.28) (2.73) (2.39) 
Tobin's q  -0.344*** -0.343*** -0.521*** -0.534*** 
 
(-4.06) (-4.12) (-4.74) (-4.88) 
Target Characteristics 
    log (total assets) -0.080 -0.071 -0.219 -0.272 
 
(-0.60) (-0.54) (-1.28) (-1.59) 
Tobin's q -0.008 0.008 -0.170* -0.165* 
 
(-0.11) (0.11) (-1.74) (-1.69) 
Deal Characteristics  
    Tender offer (dummy) -0.716*  -0.708* -0.637 -0.603 
 
(-1.69) (-1.71) (-1.16) (-1.11) 
Cash (dummy) 0.438 0.489 0.529 0.520 
 
(1.02) (1.16) (0.95) (0.94) 
Diversification (dummy) 0.487 0.374 0.608 0.538 
 
(1.10) (0.89) (1.06) (0.96) 
Governance indices  










































Year fixed  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry fixed  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Adjusted R2 0.015 0.024 0.032 0.035 
Observations  392 407 392 406 
